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The Nietzschean Concept of Becoming in the
Figures of Christ and Zorba the Greek
Peter Klapes

T

he Biblical figure of Jesus Christ, it would seem, is an
embodiment of exactly the sort of fusion—of Apollo and
Dionysius; of the rational and the irrational—that Friedrich Nietzsche admired in Greek tragedy. As both
Paul’s “folly to philosophers” and John’s “Logos” (Λόγος),
Christ symbolizes the humanization—and thus rationalization—
of the mystery of God, just as much as he magnifies the contradictory and absurd nature of the world and of human life. Furthermore, on the cross, Christ’s kenotic, or emptying act, can be read
as a facilitation of a Nietzschean annihilation of being, which becomes substituted by the notion of becoming.
In what follows, I will attempt to investigate two narratives—one Pre-Nietzsche and one Post-Nietzsche: that of the biblical Christ and that of writer-philosopher Nikos Kazantzakis’
Zorba the Greek—as ‘lived’ examples of Nietzschean thought.
In rejecting the philosophical notion of being (that is,
fixed entities or substances), Nietzsche attempts to draw our attention towards the nothingness (and therefore, infinite freedom)
that underlies human existence. By accepting the human condition of nothingness and freedom, it can be understood that one
never is, but also, that one is always becoming. As one, following
Nietzsche’s exhortation, ‘gazes into the abyss’ and accepts one’s
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essential emptiness, one opens oneself up to the possibility of an
infinitely and radically free sense of personal existence. Though
Nietzsche credits Heraclitus, the Greek pre-Socratic philosopher,
for such notion (“Heraclitus will remain eternally right with his
assertion that being is an empty fiction”),1 it appears as though, in
many ways, Nietzsche—a philologist after all—foresaw the later
evolution of conceptions of language, signification, and the linguistic connection (or disconnection) with ontology. That is to
say, that if the nature of the linguistic sign is arbitrary and the
signifier and signified are bound merely by a superficial social
contract, then it must be the case that our own being—
existence—is always realized through negation, and not predication. In the statement “I am me”, ‘me’ is an empty sign. It gives
us no information about the ‘I’, and the ‘I’, therefore, also remains empty. However, if I were to say that “I am not a tree”,
then the ‘I’—the ego—would begin to take on meaning. In fact,
the ‘I’ can be defined merely through an infinite list of nots—
negations. The ‘I’ is free to bear an infinity of significations because, at its base, it bears no a priori signification. Its innate
nothingness frees the ‘I’ to be defined in infinite ways.
The Nietzschean notion of the necessity of the annihilation of being in an opening up to infinite becoming can be observed in the figure of Christ. In his Letter to the Philippians,
Saint Paul writes that “Jesus made himself nothing” (Philippians
2:7). By negating his very being—Jesus opened himself up to
infinite becoming. Through his empting act, Christ’s free, irrational, and contradictory (perhaps even Dionysian) essence is
called forth. Being nothing, Christ can become God and man at
once. He is, in such a manner, free (e.g. of binary oppositions,
transcendental signification, etc.). In becoming nothing, Christ
can live contradictorily: he can legitimately be both man and
God. In a similar manner, according to the Kabbalistic concept of
tzimtzum, God facilitated creation through self-annihilation (or
perhaps more appropriately, through self-contraction). God diminishes—or contracts—himself in order to create (humanity).
God dies on the cross in order to save (humanity). Through, in
Nietzschean terms, the “death [or crucifixion] of God”, humanity
is saved from its imprisonment. Humanity is saved from the hala-
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kha (Jewish religious law), and finds itself free from its previously ritualistic existence that applied transcendental signification to
such things as even the penile foreskin. With Christ—who eventually comes to symbolize the death of God—the physical world
loses its significance: it loses its fetishized status. Through the
annihilation of such fetishizations, the human individual becomes
free. The foreskin no longer signifies respect for God; the foreskin merely signifies the foreskin (which, after all, due to the arbitrariness and meaninglessness of predication, would signify that
the foreskin is nothing). The acceptance of the essential nothingness of the real world, which Christ brings about, seems to be the
ultimate project of Nietzsche’s thought and such a removal of significant meaning even from death itself seems to be a result of
Christ’s emptying act. Again, in his Letter to the Philippians, Paul
tells us that just as soon as he “became nothing”, Christ “became
obedient to death—even death on a cross!” (Philippians 2:9-10).
By becoming obedient to the reality of death, Christ remains stoically neutral towards his humanely fate: he neither fights it nor
celebrates it. He applies no meaning or transcendental significance to it: he accepts it as reality. Much like Nietzsche’s Goethe,, Christ appears as a “free spirit [, a spirit that] stands in the
midst of the universe with a joyful and trusting fatalism […] that
in the totality everything is redeemed and affirmed—he no longer
denies.”2 Such a kenosis—of the “fiction of being”; of the imprisoning divinity that we believe lies within us—seems to fall well
within Nietzsche’s vision for humanity. Much like Christ, we
must purge from within us the things that lift us up, bind us, and
connect us; which define us and limit our freedom. Through such
kenosis of being, we live, as Nietzsche suggests, in light of becoming.
If we accept that God is everything, then it must be the
case that God is also nothing, for within the set of everything,
even nothing resides. In the same way, if God is everything, then
God must also be man. Transitively, man—who, because of his
nothingness, is free to be anything and everything—must be God.
Indeed, Christ’s figure wholeheartedly represents this very notion. Such a notion of man who is both nothing and who can be
anything—as formalized through the philosophy of Nietzsche—
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can also be seen in Nikos Kazantzakis’ Zorba the Greek.
On the most basic level, Kazantzakis’ novel represents
exactly what Nietzsche so very much loved about Greek tragedy.
The narrator, a young intellectual man described as valuing
books over firsthand experience, represents the Apollonian, while
Alexis Zorba, whose lasciviousness, drunkenness, and antireason attitude seems almost unbelievable, represents the Dionysian. On another level, however, the novel stands for the innate
contradictoriness of the world. Zorba, in particular, represents the
free man who, like God, Christ, and Nietzsche’s Übermensch,
lives a full life as he accepts his ability to be everything which
comes through an acceptance of his innate nothingness. Following the teachings of his elder, Zorba, Kazantzakis’s narrator
(whomwe shall call “the Boss,” as Zorba does) finally realizes
humanity’s freedom: “One sees clearly now that he is nothing”.3
In fact, by emptying the world one sees that anything is possible.
Zorba, the Dionysian, lives in a dark, drunken state where borders become invisible, and where contradictions are impossible.
The Boss, nonetheless, describes his friend’s synthetic mind:
“God, the business’s best interests, and the widow had joined together inextricably in Zorba’s mind.”4 Most importantly, however, through the freedom that Zorba exhibits, God becomes possible. As one purges oneself of the logical, artificial boundaries
that society has fabricated, the concept of God becomes possible.
In Zorba’s world where, through negation, everything becomes
possible, God becomes possible as well. The Dionysian remarks:
“Does God exist or does he not exist? What says Your Highness?
And if God does exist (everything is possible, after all) how do
you imagine him?”.5 God is illogical, and it would seem that the
existentialist—who sees beyond the oppressive force of logic—
can accept the notion of God if they so choose.
A concrete example of the productive nature of the destructive act is seen through Zorba’s severance of his finger. In a
broader discussion about aesthetics, artistic production, and
Zorba’s dabbling in pottery, Zorba recounts:
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So once I was a potter. I was crazy
about that trade. Do you know
what it means to take a lump of
clay and make what you want out
of it? The wheel and clay spin
around like mad—ffrrr!—with
you standing over them saying
[…] ‘I’ll make the Devil knows
what! That means, I’m telling
you, that you’re truly human.
Free! […]
‘So what about the finger?’, I
asked.
‘It got in the way on the wheel,
kept getting in the middle and
spoiling my design. So one day I
grabbed an adze and—’
‘Didn’t it hurt?’
‘Of course it hurt! Am I a tree trunk? I’m a man: it hurt. But it
hindered me in my work, I’m telling you. So I cut it off!’”6
Here we see that in order to create, some sort of destruction must
occur. In this instance, it seems clear that Kazantzakis draws a
parallel between his Zorba and the Judeo-Christian God, who is,
in the Bible, often portrayed as the potter (and we—humanity—
and the world, his pottery). God and Zorba both create through
annihilation, contraction (as the Kabbalistic term holds), or severance. As Zorba tells us, it is when he realizes that he is “[…] truly
human! Free!”, that he is able to face his full creative potential.
The severance of a finger symbolizes, in the grander picture, the
purging—emptying—of worldly fetishizations. The fetishized
organs (think anal, oral, etc.), to which one becomes, in Freudian
terms, ‘fixed,’ get in the way of orgasm or, in this case, orgasm’s
close relative: art (which, much like orgasm, symbolizes the harmonization of the non-empirical and the empirical; the union of
fantasy and physical object). Just as God, Zorba creates through
annihilation. God’s creation and Zorba’s creation occur in an
identical manner. Creating art is cathartic: it occurs as an emptying of oneself into the Other (whether the Other be, in God’s
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case, man, or, in Zorba’s case, pottery). When one creates, one
ceases existing as oneself, as an individual: one becomes split,
existing as oneself, the creator, and as one’s Other, the created.
The act of creation is, in Nietzschean terms, living as becoming,
for it requires one to annihilate the “fiction of being,” “gaze into
the abyss,” and realize his freedom and nothingness. Creation, in
this way, is destruction just as destruction is (and is a necessary
predicate of) creation.
Another instance in which we see similarities among
Christ, Nietzsche, and Zorba (in whom Kazantzakis seems to be
actively interweaving the former two) is through the concept of
becoming-child. Matthew reports to us that Jesus thus advised:
“unless you change and become like little children, you will never enter the kingdom of heaven” (Matthew 18:2-4). Much like a
child, Jesus constantly speaks in metaphor (where the use of metaphor itself speaks to the fact that we understand what something
is through difference—through the fact that something is not
something, not that something is something), using basic examples to communicate his thoughts. Often, in fact, Jesus appears as
a child (after all, he is the son!) who privileges action over
speech. He never wrote anything down. In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche celebrates the child: “But say, my brothers, what
can the child do that even the lion cannot do? The child is innocence and forgetting, a new beginning, a game, a self-propelled
wheel, a first movement, a sacred Yes-saying”.7 And finally, on
New Year’s in Kazantzakis’ novel, Zorba tells us that “for me,
just like the New Year I become a small child again; like Christ I
am reborn. The way he is born every year, so am I”.8 In the examples at hand, we see a celebration of childhood. We see characters who exhibit a “sacred Yes-saying” for life, who act as if
before their entrance into the Lacanian symbolic. They communicate using metaphors and their bodies. Indeed, Zorba communicates through dance and seems to have no patience for verbal language as we see in his remark: “men have sunk very low. They've
let their bodies become mute and they only speak with their
mouths. But what d'you expect a mouth to say? What can it tell
you?”.9 Christ, Zarathustra, and Zorba are not encumbered by
what Nietzsche would call the fiction of logic, or the fiction of
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reason: they are carnal creatures, in touch with man’s ability to
exist freely and infinitely, laudably innocent in the light of absurd
humanly constructs.
A staunch atheist, the German existentialist Friedrich Nietzsche is one of Christianity’s most known critics. Despite his
distrust of Christianity itself, Nietzsche has communicated some
inkling of respect for Christ, remarking that “there was only one
Christian, and he died on the cross.”10 In fact, much of Nietzsche’s philosophy can be read and realized through the biblical
figure of Jesus Christ. A man who makes God rational through
his being Word, Jesus serves as a concrete example of the mystical Hebraic God. At the same time, Jesus is a manifestation of
utter irrationality and absurdity of human life. Embodying both
the divine and the physical, Jesus symbolizes the existential freedom—the infinitude—that is found at the center of every human
individual. In many ways, Jesus’ freedom, as well as his ability to
annihilate the world’s trivialities, is an example of Nietzsche’s
ideal man. Compared, on many an account, to Christ and to God,
Alexis Zorba symbolizes a lived example of Nietzschean philosophy. It seems to be no coincidence to me that Zorba—who Kazantzakis developed with Nietzschean thought in mind—has been
compared (both para- and inner-textually) to Christ. Both characters seem to have successfully—as Nietzsche would celebrate—
annihilated “the fiction of being” in order to live in light of becoming. Both characters have realized their essential nothingness,
have recognized their own existential freedom, and have ultimately been able to see their own lives in light of the infinity of life
itself. Their transcendence of fetishizations —which, needless to
say, lead to feelings of regret and guilt and shame, and which otherwise limit one’s innate freedom—allows them to live their lives
in infinite ways, in accordance merely with their own choosing. It
is telling, nonetheless, that a Nietzschean line can be sewn in a
connecting manner through centuries upon centuries of human
thought, regardless of the fact that Nietzsche died just over a century ago.
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